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‘Inauthentic’ Sukumbasi: The Politics of Aesthetics and 
Urgency in Kathmandu
This article discusses how claims of the urban 
poor for the right to the city come up against 
governmental programs seeking to secure 
norms of private property, environmental 
sustainability, and elite aesthetics. Here, the 
city in question is Kathmandu, Nepal, and the 
urban poor are referred to as sukumbasi, 
squatters. Baviskar (2011) defines ‘elite politics’ 
as a mode of expressing anxieties of the self 
in relation to one’s physical surroundings. I 
interpret a liberal environmentalist project— 
the Bagmati Action Plan—in terms of such an 
elite politics, and explore the ways in which 
this river restoration program was taken up 
by the Nepali state. I show how bourgeois 
liberal environmentalism, when it encounters 
‘the slum,’ produces spatial imaginaries, such 
as ‘pure rivers’ and ‘green riverbanks,’ and 
representations of sukumbasi as ‘inauthentic’ 
residents. This logic often furnishes the 
rationale for violently expelling sukumbasi 
from the slum and the city. 
Adopting the state’s governmental frames 
to distinguish between ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi, the Bagmati Action 
Plan’s leadership produced class cleavage 
among the landless—between squatters, who 
were alleged to be ‘landed’ and those given 
a ‘landless’ designation. As such, this article 
asks two questions: How does the threat of 
violence forge sukumbasi political subjectivity 
and inform renewed strategies of inhabitance? 
And, what implications these strategies have 
for understanding the challenges facing the 
politics of the poor? These inquiries locate 
the practices of the poor within the context 
of a ‘politics of urgency’— an ad hoc creative 
and counterintuitive ‘non-movement’ forged 
in the crucible of crisis, in which the organized 
practice of everyday life is disrupted and 
stretched in new and uncertain directions. 
Keywords: Kathmandu, sukumbasi, solidarity, politics, 
inauthenticity, aesthetics. 
Sabin Ninglekhu
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Introduction
September 3, 2010, signaled a watershed moment in 
the restoration of the Bagmati River. The river has its 
origin in Shiv Puri, the northeast end of the city. Along 
with its tributaries, the Bagmati cuts through the city of 
Kathmandu and exits the Kathmandu Valley from the 
south. Discussions for the Bagmati Action Plan (BAP), as 
the river restoration effort is called, had begun in 2007 
after a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed 
between the United Nation’s Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the National Trust for Nature Conservation 
(NTNC). A complete version of the plan was developed in 
December 2009. Madhav Kumar Nepal, prime minister at 
the time and a prominent leader of Nepal’s United Marxist 
Leninist (UML) Party, marked the occasion with a jubilant 
remark: “Just like everyone here, I dream of being able to 
jog along the Bagmati banks early [in the] morning and 
breathe fresh air. I urge all to support the government bid 
of restoring the Bagmati to its original pristine condition” 
(The Himalayan Times 2005).1 He followed the call by 
declaring the BAP a project of national priority.2  
The following year, in 2010, an implementation committee 
for the BAP was formed, called the Bagmati Civilization 
Integrated Development Committee (BCIDC). As a five-
year project, BAP’s goal is to clean up the Bagmati River by 
installing wastewater treatment plants on the riverbanks 
and restoring the river’s aesthetic and cultural values (BAP 
Draft Report 2008). Under the plan, it is mandatory that 20 
meters on either side of the river be cleared of any kind of 
activity—commercial or residential. Eviction of fourteen 
settlements on the banks of the Bagmati and its tributar-
ies was therefore deemed mandatory for implementing        
the BAP. 
This article and the research it represents is part of a 
larger body of work that examines the interface at which 
state-led projects of development in the city encounter the 
livelihood of city inhabitants. One question guiding this 
work is: How do state-led projects, as they encounter the 
‘slum,’ produce spatial imaginaries and portray subjects? 
For example, the state mobilizes phrases such as ‘pure 
river’ and ‘green parks’ as part of a discursive exercise to 
promote the BAP. Concurrently, the state also portrays 
sukumbasi, the urban landless who inhabit the riverbanks, 
as ‘inauthentic’ residents who are obstacles to realizing 
the goals of the BAP.3 Together these discourses provide a 
rationale expelling sukumbasi from the settlements and the 
city and add a sense of urgency to this endeavor. This leads 
to another, interrelated question: How does the threat of 
violence and eviction forge sukumbasi political subjectiv-
ity and inform renewed strategies of inhabitation as well 
as resistance to the BAP? This second question, in turn, 
prompts an examination of the limits and potential of the 
politics of the poor. 
The first section of the paper focuses on the discursive 
ways in which the state portrays the BAP to the public in 
the city. The erasure of sukumbasi settlements on the river-
bank is a necessary precondition for implanting the action 
plan. This, in turn, necessitates that the state furnish a 
‘rationale’ for the plan to justify the potential violence 
contained within the plan. As such, this section shows 
how the state takes recourse to a double-sided politics of 
aesthetics. This brand of politics at once expresses nos-
talgia for the city rooted in ‘civilization,’ and articulates 
a desire beholden to the spirits of a homemade version of 
the ‘world class city.’4 This politics of aesthetics is not only 
in the service of the production of space. Co-constituted 
with the production of space is also, as mentioned earlier, 
a portrayal of the sukumbasi as ‘inauthentic.’ 
The article then turns toward the politics of subjectivity, 
which may be understood as “…the lived multiplicity of 
positioning” (Blackman et al. 2008: 6). How can the politics 
of subjectivity provide a way to analyze the multiple ways 
in which the poor reframe their subject position in relation 
to the state-led politics of aesthetics? In response to the 
BAP and its attendant politics of aesthetics, sukumbasi find 
tactical ways to acquiesce to the allegations of ‘inauthen-
ticity’. In so doing, they tend to aestheticize their own 
politics, thereby producing a cleavage within sukumbasi 
communities. As such, if lived experience is central to the 
formation of sukumbasi solidarity, then the recourse to 
aesthetics renders the solidarity ad hoc, and in the process, 
reveals fractures within the sukumbasi class group. 
The final section of this article examines the ‘right to 
the city’—a politics that is forged by the urban poor, in 
response to being culturally marginalized and materially 
oppressed, to make claims for formal as well as substantive 
rights (Marcuse 2012). Here, I discuss the implications of 
the co-constituted politics of aesthetics and inauthenticity 
for examining the limits of the politics of the poor. 
Bagmati Action Plan: A Case of Bourgeois 
Environmentalism
Kathmandu’s transformation in the last two decades may 
be characterized by several factors: the “gentrification of 
state-spaces” (Ghertner 2011) that favor the propertied 
residents for accessing municipal services; the vision of 
‘urban gigantism’ underwriting direct investments which 
fund the construction of high-rise buildings and gated 
communities; and the conformity of such transformations 
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to elusive logics such as ‘aesthetics,’ ‘civilization,’ and ‘mo-
dernity.’ However, in imagining Kathmandu as an unfold-
ing processual politics of a potentially bourgeois desire, 
one ought not lose sight of a relational co-constitution 
of the production of ‘slum’ as an attendant politics of the 
transformation. 
These urban transformations may be seen as a mode 
of expression of the anxieties and desires of the self in 
relation to one’s physical surroundings; the ‘self,’ for the 
purposes of this article, may be understood as the state or 
the civil society in its myriad incarnations: NGOs, neigh-
borhood associations, community-based organizations and 
many similar assemblages. Some of such politics contain 
exclusive tendencies that urban sociologist Amita Baviskar 
(2003) chooses to call “bourgeois environmentalism”: an 
organized force that links upper class concerns around 
aesthetics, public health, safety, leisure and civic order 
with environmental concerns. According to Baviskar, 
these concerns combine to see, and portray, the urban 
poor as “the specter of dirt, disease, and crime, a monster 
threatening the body civic” (2003: 92). The politics that is 
assembled around putting bourgeois environmentalism 
to motion, Baviskar argues, also challenges us to critical-
ly investigate the configuration of a public sphere that 
promotes the voice of the upper class as legitimate, while 
excluding, in the process, the concerns of the urban poor 
and their most basic service needs. A similar mode of class 
politics is evident in Kathmandu when one traces the 
discursive and political terrain from which the BAP gleans 
a ‘moral’ content. I interpret the bourgeois project of envi-
ronmentalism, which got taken up by the state in the form 
of the BAP, in terms of such class politics. More specifi-
cally, I focus on the alignment of middle-class aspirations 
with the ideals of the state insofar as it relates to the BAP, 
and the modalities of the exclusion of the urban poor that 
such an alignment would engender. 
BAP is not exclusively driven by market demands or 
private alliances. It does not come across as a branding 
mechanism dictated by the logic of the ‘World City.’ While 
the BAP is partially funded by the Japan Water Agency 
(JWA), the funding is still not part of the circuit of capital 
and ideas that are dictated by global financial capital-
ism. In a report that describes the plan in detail, specific 
reference is made to a rehabilitation of Nanjing-Qinhuai 
River in China as an example from which to draw inspi-
ration. Citing the apparent success of the rehabilitation 
project that faced similar problems that the Bagmati River 
faces—“illegal squatters,” a “filthy environment,” and a 
“contaminated smelly river” as described in the report— 
now “Nanjing-Qinhuai River has become a historical scenic 
zone, a cultural scenic zone and tourism scenic zone char-
acterizing the ancient civilization of Nanjing” (BAP 2009: 
5). The reference to ‘civilization’ as one of the logics for 
rehabilitation of the Bagmati River comes up frequently 
during interviews with the planners involved in the BAP. 
But no other symbolic or material links can be traced to 
the Nanjing-Qinhuai project. BAP does echo what Ghertner 
(2015) calls a ‘World-Class City Aesthetic’—an idealized 
vision of a modern, ‘green’ city that is devoid of slum-like 
dirt. As such, for a city-making project, such as the BAP, 
that confirms to such aesthetic standards, creating a field 
of perception is a necessary step in the production of city 
spaces that are considered desirable. However, unlike the 
World Class City projects, the field of perception is yoked 
less to “fantastic futurism” (Ghertner 2015), and more to 
the time in which the river and its banks were the habitus 
and harbinger of ‘civilization.’ 
The Bagmati water has always been a potent carrier of 
purity. Traditional waterspouts, rest homes, and temples 
are found on the banks of the Bagmati. Ghat, platforms on 
which Hindu mortuary rituals are performed, line the riv-
er. Pointing to these structures and rituals, Mahesh Basnet, 
the ex-chairman of the BAP, claims, “The civilization of 
the city hinged on the river and its purity. Therefore, it is 
important to protect the river” (Interview, 12 September, 
2012). In the nostalgic pursuit of what may be called the 
‘authentic’ city, photographs and maps of the river and the 
riparian landscapes depicting the pristine-looking river 
are highlighted during meetings, seminars, and interviews 
to advance a certain politics of aesthetics necessary to 
reclaim the authentic city—the city that was. However, the 
realization of this politics of aesthetics, which is intended 
to make the BAP legible and legitimate, hinges on the evic-
tion of the poor from the spaces they inhabit. One neces-
sary tactic the state deployed, as a result, was to mobilize 
the discourse of ‘inauthenticity.’ 
Fourteen squatter settlements on the banks of the Bag-
mati and its tributaries are under threat of eviction due to 
the BAP. These settlements all fall under the plan’s urban 
zone, for which there are four different goals outlined: 
improve the river quality; improve the riparian landscape; 
manage the squatter settlements along the riverbanks; and 
conserve and regenerate tangible and intangible cultural 
heritage (BAP 2008). Together, these goals link concerns 
for the environment with concerns about heritage, and of 
course, the livelihood on the riverbanks. The benevolent 
intention inherent in these goals is met with questions by 
the sukumbasi, some NGOs, and the public because of the 
propensity for violence implicit in one of these goals also 
contain—namely, the state’s attempt to manage the squat-
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ter settlements. In the past, such ‘management’ has either 
resulted in outright eviction with no resettlement plan or 
attempts at relocation that have failed one after another. 
It was therefore important for BCIDC to add legitimacy as 
well as urgency to the plan to make it a project that was 
mandatory not just on environmental grounds but also 
necessary on ethical grounds. As such, the recourse to dis-
courses of the different variants of ‘the environment’ and 
the ‘inauthentic sukumbasi’ was a necessary tool for BCIDC 
to provide a rationale for the legitimacy of eviction with 
or without resettlement. Such discourses would normally 
animate public events that BCIDC organized to promote 
the BAP. 
One such event was primarily targeted at journalists. 
A handful of prominent political leaders representing 
Nepal’s major parties were invited to the event as speak-
ers. After an opening presentation by one of committee 
members outlining BAP’s implementation methods and 
its intended targets, the politicians took turns speaking. 
The common theme in their speeches was nostalgia for the 
river that no longer was what it used to be. Every now and 
then, the ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi would be held responsi-
ble for the river’s degradation, rendering their expulsion 
from the riverbanks necessary. As her opening remarks 
at one of the meetings, a top leader of the United Marxist         
Leninist Party (UML) revisited her experience of the Bag-
mati from almost a decade ago. She was at the Bagmati Riv-
er to pay tribute to her dead husband, who had also been 
a prominent UML leader. As part of the ritual, she remem-
bered dipping her hands into the river to pocket a cupful 
of water. She let the water rest in her palms momentarily, 
and then let it slip through her fingers as she said prayers 
for the departed. Returning home that day, she could smell 
something but wasn’t sure where the smell was coming 
from—herself or her surroundings. This smell lasted for 
a few days. It was only later that she realized she had 
been walking around with a pair of hands that carried the 
stench of the Bagmati water. She later lamented the river’s 
loss of ‘purity.’ Another speaker later endorsed BAP with a 
nod to those hands: “As long as the river is not clean, just 
like the fellow speaker’s hands, the civilization of this city, 
too, shall always stink.” The anecdote presents water as a 
potent carrier of purity. The metaphors serve the purpose 
of combining threats to religious practices with threats to 
the body and the city—‘civilization’ being the overriding 
theme. As such, sukumbasi had to be something more than 
just an ‘obstacle’ settled on the riverbank that was not so 
much ‘land’ as the river’s right-of-way. They also had to be 
portrayed as polluters of purity. 
Anne Rademacher (2009) notes that in the immediate 
aftermath of the state of emergency in late 2001, during 
the time when the People’s War was at its peak, sukumbasi 
were portrayed as a “security concern.” The sukumbasi set-
tlements on the riverbanks, the state feared, were “a rela-
tively uncontrolled space where rural dissent and rebellion 
might assemble and take refuge in the city” (Rademacher 
2009: 520). State-led environmental interventions, there-
fore, had to be understood in the broader context of the 
People’s War as well as the prevailing understanding of 
sukumbasi as ‘dirt’ and an ‘eye sore.’ Relocating a sukumbasi 
Figure 1. A sukumbasi 
settlement on the banks of 
the Bagmati River. 
(Ninglekhu, 2013)
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settlement to the outskirts of the city was therefore, also, 
finding a place for sukumbasi culturally, environmentally, 
as well as politically—to secure the city from a potential 
upsurge of class-based violence. 
Official documents indicate that what sukumbasi claimed 
as land was not ‘land’ per se, but rather the Bagmati’s 
riverbed. It was so because channelization of flow from 
harvesting of sand and municipal out-takes up-stream had 
reduced the water level, and prevented the Bagmati River 
and its tributaries from flowing at their previous levels for 
many years. Dams built in response as restoration schemes 
for re-submerging exposed sand flats would trap sediment 
during the annual monsoon and thereby raise riverbed 
levels. The raised riverbed, according to the planning 
documents, would be claimed by sukumbasi for encroach-
ment. “Sukumbasi were thereby considered obstacles to 
restoring that flow, having claimed river territory as land 
in a way that was inconsistent with perceived ecological 
order. Their land claims were rendered illegitimate in 
urban environmental terms as they were in legal terms,” 
claims Rademacher (2009: 519). However, maintaining 
water flow is crucial to the environment as much as it is to 
‘culture’ —which the BAP committee frames through the 
discourse of ‘civilization,’ as alluded to by a former Deputy    
Project Manager of BCIDC, Anil Bhadra Khanal. Khanal 
says, “[Restoration] is not just about the river. It is also 
about religious and cultural heritages that lie on the river-
banks. These are structures that ensure sustenance of our 
cultural and religious practices, which are tied to civiliza-
tion. Our festivals and mortuary rituals that we perform on 
the river needs water flow. To ensure that the festivals and 
rituals continue to exist, we need to make sure that the 
river continues to flow” (Interview, 23 October, 2012).   
These claims of environmental health in relation to 
cultural practices added legitimacy with recourse to a 
nostalgia that was meant to evoke memories of a civilized 
Kathmandu and, subsequently, a desire to restore civiliza-
tion by rebuilding heritage along the riverbanks. When I 
questioned Mahesh Basnet, the ex-chairman, about what 
‘civilization’ indicated, he said: “[the] Bagmati carries not 
just the river’s civilization, but civilization of the entire 
city. Therefore, to revive the city’s civilization, it is im-
portant that we bring back our traditional structures like 
water-spouts, temples, and so on.” Restoring structures on 
the riverbanks to revive civilization has functional as well 
as aesthetic value, as Basnet implies. But when deployed 
as a tool with a political function, ‘civilization’ becomes 
a potent weapon to delegitimize the poor. The particu-
lar strategy of enmeshing culture and morality with the 
environment in attempts at river restoration has a long 
tradition that has relied on ‘othering’ migrants as people 
without the ability of understanding the river’s culture. 
What is peculiar about Kathmandu’s case, however, is that 
it is the state seizing the middle-class discourse about 
‘civilization’ and ‘inauthenticity’ to endorse the project of 
environmentalism. The prevailing consciousness considers 
clean river water and green river banks more important 
than livelihood and shelter for the working poor who in-
habit the riverbank. These raise a pertinent question: How 
does ‘the environment’ serve as an optic through which 
poverty and the poor are reframed en route to building the 
good city?
The ‘Authentic’ City 
Hutta Ram Baidya is a Kathmandu native who comes from 
a middle-class family. An engineer by profession, he has 
earned the moniker ‘Bagmati Baa’ or ‘the Bagmati Man’—a 
tribute to his lifelong dedication to, in his words, “sav-
ing the Bagmati.” A native of Kathmandu, after working 
independently for several decades to clean up the Bagmati 
River, he has now retired from the activism that gave him 
the moniker. For all the recognition that is granted to him 
as an environmental activist, the river has little to show 
for Hutta Ram Ji’s lifelong dedication. The section of the 
river that flows through the heart of the city looks like an 
open sewer. 
When I went to see Hutta Ram Ji in his residence, my hope 
of hearing him speak about his Bagmati restoration efforts 
were momentarily dashed. His opening was rather dismis-
sive, “So you want to know about the Bagmati? What do 
you want to do with it? There is nothing to know.” It was 
as if it was he who wanted to know nothing more about 
the Bagmati. He then lifted himself up and walked away 
from the patio overlooking the busy street. The pungent 
smell coming from the nearby Tukuche—a tributary of the 
Bagmati—did little to comfort me as I waited for his next 
move. A few seconds later, from inside his room, Hutta 
Ram Ji raised his voice, instructing me to come inside his 
bedroom. I obliged. He gestured with his right hand that I 
sit on the chair next to him, while his left hand played with 
the mouse, frantically moving the cursor up and down on 
his desktop screen. He then turned to me, feigned a wry 
smile and asked, in a hopeful tone, if I would be able to 
read an email from his son in the United States. He said his 
eyes hurt. 
After I hesitantly read the email, he pointed to a corner 
of the room. There were three old suitcases, one on top of 
the other. He then asked me to fetch him the one in the 
middle, place it on the bed next to the computer, and open 
HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 1 |  77
it. In it was a pile of documents—newspaper cutouts, old 
photos, certificates—all of them related to the  
Bagmati River. Most of them black and white, the news-
paper cutouts and photos depicted the pristine-looking 
Bagmati of history. He picked one from the pile, a picture 
that he took of the UN Park, built in the 1990s on a section 
of the riverbank in Thapathali by the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Population. It was to commemorate the 50th-
year anniversary of the UN’s presence in Nepal. At the end 
of the park bordering the river, there is an embankment 
made of concrete walls. 
The river cannot speak. Therefore, Hutta Ram Ji speaks on 
its behalf, in the process abstracting the nature, the river, 
from its social entanglement. The river has its own culture 
that is eroding after it came in contact with ‘develop-
ment.’ Hutta Ram ji bemoans, “Why regulate the flow of 
the river? Are we supposed to clean up the riverbank by 
building parks and dams, or do we first try to understand 
what Bagmati’s heart desires and follow accordingly. Who 
are we to control nature? How can we say we are protect-
ing her when we are regulating her?” He insinuates that 
the UN Park is a case of “development” disrupting the 
river’s natural state. “It is impossible to clean the Bagmati 
just by spending millions. There is no need to murder the 
river’s culture in the name of development. Development 
is not good when there is no consideration for nature                
and culture.” 
Across the river, at the opposite end of UN Park, there 
is a sukumbasi settlement called Paurakhi Basti. It is not 
very far from Hutta Ram Ji’s house. Therefore, when Hutta 
Ram Ji confides in me his concerns by pointing to one 
of the bedroom walls, it may be fair to assume that he 
could be talking about Paurakhi Basti that is to be blamed, 
just like the state is to be blamed, for ruining the river. 
“They [the sukumbasi] are the culprits that disrespected                    
Bagmati’s culture. They encroach because the government 
is too weak to do anything about it. Because they find the 
government weak, they then started making demands.” He 
continues, “Why demand land? Why not other necessities 
of life? What about employment?” After pausing briefly, he 
bemoans, “The Bagmati was not always this bad.” 
Hutta Ram Ji continues, “Those who came to the city early 
on were hard working people. Even if they lived on the 
riverbanks, they worked hard to make a living, and would 
later move elsewhere. It was those who followed the early 
migrants that would never leave. They have remained on 
the riverbank ever since…These people [the sukumbasi] do 
not know about the river’s culture because they are not 
from Kathmandu. They do not care.” The objectification of 
nature, the river, as something with a culture of its own, 
is lent further credibility via subjection of sukumbasi as 
people ignorant of the river’s culture. 
Hutta Ram Ji passed away in December 2013. He left behind 
rich imprints on the on-going restoration efforts led by so-
cial groups as well as the state. He is credited with coining 
the term ‘Bagmati Civilization,’ which articulates a desire 
to restore the city’s civilization through restoration of 
the Bagmati River. BCIDC borrows its naming from Hutta 
Ram Ji’s phrase. ‘Civilization’ continues to be an enduring 
environmental theme in citizen-led environmental activ-
ism for river restoration. ‘Civilization,’ in such a sense, is 
indeed about restoring old temples and traditional taps, as 
is officially invoked. In addition to rebuilding the heritage, 
‘civilization’ is also protective of the ‘culture’ (of the river), 
which is only possible once the polluter of the culture is 
identified, and subsequently removed. As a result, subse-
quent efforts towards preserving the Bagmati have done 
so by separating the polluters from the protectors. Unlike 
Hutta Ram Ji, who blamed both the state and the society 
for ruining the river, these latter efforts, such as the BAP, 
or the Friends of Bagmati, have firmly put the blame on 
one section of the society: the sukumbasi. 
“It was Hutta Ram Baidya who made the government 
realize that preserving the Bagmati was not just about 
restoring the health of the river water but also about 
restoring civilization,” says Megh Ale, president of Friends 
of Bagmati, an NGO committed to the goal of restoring 
the Bagmati’s environment. While it is not clear from 
their website what ‘environment’ suggests, restoring it 
implies addressing more than just the water quality. The 
organization laments the loss of ‘purity’ and ‘integrity’ of 
the ‘scared’ river. As stated in organizational documents, 
it is committed to saving the Bagmati’s “cultural, natural 
and heritage significance from pollution and other 
threats.” One of the flagship events of Friends of Bagmati 
is the Bagmati River Festival, an annual event. Over the 
course of the day, the event turns into a spectacle for 
the public. Public officials, political party leaders, NGO 
representatives, and media personnel are all invited to the 
event as ‘stakeholders.’ “We live here on the riverbank, yet 
somehow we are not the stakeholders of the river,” says a 
resident of a settlement in Sankhamul.  
Ghertner (2010) contends that in the absence of maps, 
statistics, and documents, the raw materials that legitimiz-
es rule, and on which rule is founded, aesthetics serves as 
a governing logic for doing development. The politics of 
aesthetics is one of the central logics of the BAP. Aesthet-
ics, as a politics of desire, also becomes a discursive site 
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around which state and middle and upper-middle class 
interests coalesce as a force of bourgeois environmental-
ism that puts under threat structures and people that are 
deemed to potentially disrupt the making of the order of 
aesthetics. The environmental and ecological practices led 
by the elite in collaboration with different state bodies, 
actively and passively, therefore seek to draw the lines 
between migrants and the natives of Kathmandu; between 
those who belong to the city and the river versus those 
who do not not; between those who know the ‘culture’ of 
the river and those who do not. Throughout the politics of 
aesthetics, what is apparent is not the pitting of ‘nature’ 
against ‘civilization.’ Instead, the coalescing of nature with 
civilization is made visible, creating a ‘natural civilization’ 
to be reclaimed through the BAP—the reclaiming of the 
authentic city. What is it about the urban environment 
that selectively allows only elite and middle-class citizens 
to make claims about matters of public interest? Why are 
the public, and their other variants such as Friends of 
Bagmati so exclusively defined that it would leave out the        
urban poor? 
The ‘Inauthentic’ Sukumbasi 
There is a tendency to use “poverty of place” 
interchangeably with “poverty of people” (Gilbert 
2009). The dwellers (people) have to represent the 
dwelling (place)—normally a decrepit shack—in their 
appearance for them to be counted as real, or authentic. 
In other words, one has to look like a sukumbasi to be one. 
Therefore, a common expression that pervades middle-
class conversations about sukumbasi in the city is: “How 
can they be sukumbasi when they are so well-dressed 
and ride motorbikes?” In other words, they have to look 
like “matter out of place,” to use Mary Douglas’ (1966) 
metaphor of ‘dirt’ as a conceptual frame. In the case 
of sukumbasi, the optics of ‘slum’ is used as a figurative 
reference to gauge of the ‘purity’ (as an ‘authentic’ figure) 
of the sukumbasi identity as it is claimed. It is a commonly 
held belief among members of the BAP committee that 
a majority of the sukumbasi populations in the city are 
‘inauthentic’ because “they own land—if not in the city 
then elsewhere” (Mahesh Bahadur Basnet, Interview, 
12 February, 2012). Basnet further claimed, “I live next 
to the Buddha Nagar settlement.5 I have lived there for 
many years now and know many sukumbasi people there 
very well. I can say for sure that many I know have land 
either in Kathmandu or elsewhere. I don’t really know 
of any Nepali that are landless.”6 The subtext here is that 
sukumbasi are ‘inauthentic’ squatters because they are 
landowners in some place in Nepal if not in Kathmandu. 
In relation to comparative cases elsewhere, for example 
in Indian cities, critical urban scholars have argued how 
courts and media are the domains in which elite politics 
coalesce, crystallize and become more concrete (Baviskar 
2011). This germination of politics has led some to suggest 
that analysis of contemporary urban politics “account 
for the court not only as an arbiter of justice but also as a 
parallel administrative and executive body” (Bhan 2009: 
134). Starting September 2011, Nepal’s Home Ministry and 
subsequently the Department of Urban Development and 
Building Construction (DUDBC) started issuing eviction 
notice to the riverbank settlements via different news dai-
lies on a regular basis. In response, sukumbasi filed a case 
in the appellate court challenging the validity of the order 
by referring to an earlier case that had played out in 2001. 
That year, under Kathmandu’s then mayor, Keshav Sthapit, 
the municipality had signed an agreement with Society for 
Preservation of Shelter and Habitat, or Basobas, meaning 
habitat in conversational terms, that in principle provid-
ed amnesty to sukumbasi from eviction. The agreement, 
signed between Basobas and the mayor of the Kathmandu 
Municipality, was eventually rendered as having no legal 
mandate to protect sukumbasi from eviction. Consequent-
ly, the appellate court issued a 35-day stay-order to the 
plaintiff, the sukumbasi. Later, the Supreme Court of Nepal 
issued a ruling in favor of the government’s notice of evic-
tion. The involvement of the court in such processes has 
continued to take place in the promotion and implementa-
tion of BAP. 
The Politics of Subjectivity: Acquiescing to the Accusation 
of ‘Inauthenticity’
 Critical development and postcolonial studies scholars who 
give voice to the struggles of the urban poor do so from the 
standpoint of a “politics of patience”—to use Arjun Appa-
durai’s framing (Appadurai 2002: 30). This kind of politics 
is gleaned from ‘ordinary’ everyday practices that involve, 
for example, relations of patronage with lower-level state 
officials that are patiently built over a long period of time. 
These relationships enabe access to basic services that are 
crucial in transforming vacant public lands into properly 
functioning and livable neighborhoods imbued with a sense 
of place and a sense of community. In these accounts of the 
politics of the poor, through their contribution to the pro-
duction of space and the emotion and labor invested in it, 
the poor are able to form and make claims for the right to 
the city. However, when the politics of patience encounters 
a state-led development project that destabilizes the rou-
tine of the everyday life, the existing relations of patronage 
no longer work because it is normally the national-scale 
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government bodies, not the lower-level individual officials, 
that are the source of eviction threats. The poor are thus 
left with devising a new kind of politics that may be termed 
‘politics of urgency.’ 
Critical urban scholarship that has documented the inter-
face at which state-led development programs encounter 
the livelihood of the poor do so from the standpoint of gov-
ernmentalization of the state. Such an approach focuses on 
the techniques of governmentality that the state adopts by 
mobilizing certain discursive practices that render the poor 
expendable, their settlements, and practices therein. How-
ever, an inquiry into the ‘politics of urgency’ during the 
time of crisis can show that the poor are not merely passive 
recipients of developmentalist intervention from the top 
patiently devising “governmentality from below” (Appa-
durai 2002: 35). A politics of urgency can reveal the tactical 
ways in which the urban poor renegotiate their claims for 
the right to the city by turning on their heads the discur-
sive tools that the state mobilizes to subjectivize the poor. 
In the case of Kathmandu, sukumbasi couch their renewed 
demands with the state not on the same terms that were set 
in the ‘normal’ time dedicated to the politics of patience, in 
which space, and inhabitance, are central; rather, realizing 
the importance of time as a commodity in short supply 
during urgent moments, sukumbasi acquiesce to the state’s 
allegations to make renewed claims to ensure that their 
right to live in the city, to be in the city, is ensured. Aware 
of the limits of the politics of patience, sukumbasi employ 
tactical ways to renew their demands by making surprising 
attempts to act jointly with the state, not against the state, 
in distinguishing the authentic from the inauthentic sukum-
basi. The state, therefore, is not merely adversarial but also 
instrumental to the goals of realizing the sukumbasi demand 
to maintain a place in the city, in the sense that it permeat-
ed a new mode of subjectivity geared toward differentiation 
rather than solidarity amongst sukumbasi. 
Aestheticization of Politics 
Ananya Roy (2009: 160) describes “civic governmentality” 
as neither top-down nor bottom-up, but rather as a “dialec-
tical movement between insurgency and institutionaliza-
tion.” Borrowing from Roy’s framework, I see the acquies-
cence to the accusation of ‘inauthenticity’ as a technique of 
civic governmentality that rely on what may be called an 
aestheticization of politics from below. Such politics is dia-
lectical in nature, in that they engage the same terms —aes-
thetics and inauthenticity—produced from above in forging 
their politics. However, the modality through which such 
politics is forged is engineered from below. 
In 2001, Basobas conducted their first self-enumeration 
survey; the same year they had reached the agreement 
with the mayor that I describe towards the end in the pre-
vious section.7 Enumerators from Basobas visited sukumbasi 
settlements to survey household conditions, household 
size, and the demographic composition of families in the 
settlements. All family members had their photos taken 
in front of their house after each house was assigned a 
number. Family IDs issued thenceforth would contain the 
person’s name, age, sex, household number, and length 
of stay in the settlement. New settlers or migrants af-
ter 2001 would no longer be issued such ID. Apart from 
being ‘formally’ identified as sukumbasi, the ID would also 
provide a basis for accessing basic services from the local 
government—in lieu of the citizenship card or landowner-
ship certificate. That was the agreement reached with the 
municipality. 
When I asked Hukum Bahadur Lama, ex-president and one 
of the founders of Basobas, why they no longer distributed 
family IDs, he seemed to evade the question and suggest-
ed that the call was made to enable them to manage the 
sukumbasi movement more effectively. A larger number of 
sukumbasi, he explained, would mean a larger number of 
issues that must be dealt with. Whatever the rationale was 
to stop issuing the family IDs, the upshot of the decision, 
over time, was that it became harder for new sukumba-
si to claim formal citizenship rights, landownership, or 
inhabitance. Basanta Jaisi alludes to the distinction that 
evolved among sukumbasi—between ID holders and those 
who didn’t hold IDs—regarding who could claim authen-
ticity: “There are sukumbasi, hukumbasi and dalal8 in those 
settlements. We have never said that we are all authentic. 
But the government has rolled us all into one.” Jaisi signals 
a concession that there are in fact inauthentic sukumbasi: 
those without the ID. This concession, in turn, opens up 
political possibilities for sukumbasi collaborating with the 
government. Leaders like Jaisi are prepared to embrace 
the state-produced discourse of ‘inauthenticity’ in the 
hope of forging a working collaboration with the state. 
This willingness was soon put to action in the middle of an 
anti-eviction campaign in 2012. 
In early January 2012, Basobas members seemed to radiate 
excitement at the prospect of incorporating a scientific 
technology that was believed to add credibility to the 
demands upon the state. Their counterparts from India, 
staff members of Slum Dwellers International (SDI), had 
brought a biometric survey tool—a self-identification 
technology that was deemed to be successful in India.9 SDI 
members, along with Basobas staff gathered in a settle-
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ment on the southwest end of the city, where the survey 
tool would be tested. As they approached the settlement 
carrying a laptop, attached to which was a device that was 
part of the survey tool, they were met with a few curious 
onlookers who seemed to have little clue about what to 
expect from these people with gadgets. After taking a pic-
ture and collecting fingerprints from individual household 
members, the biometric survey software would digitally 
overlay the householder’s headshot, fingerprints, and the 
number on the front door of the person’s house into a dig-
ital database. The number, as discussed earlier, would have 
been issued during the self-survey conducted by Basobas 
in 2001. 
In theory, such a system would permanently digitize 
and archive the Family ID obtained in 2001, and prevent 
sukumbasi householders from swapping, selling, or renting 
out their ‘property’. Including the archived data into the 
government data system, a goal of the self-identification 
project, would also help the government crosscheck if any 
sukumbasi household legally owned land anywhere else 
in the country. Basanta Jaisi, another member of Basobas, 
explains: 
The biometric survey helps to identify sukumbasi 
along with their settlement and house number. 
Having that scientific information will make it 
easier for the government to locate sukumbasi in 
the city. Right now the survey is at an experimental 
phase. People from India are doing it. But some of 
us will learn how to use it soon. We want to show 
the results of the experiment to Mahesh Bahadur 
Basnet.10 
This scientific method lends credibility to that political 
move through the employment of scientific logic and 
bureaucratic rationality, which in turn would help create 
a social field of possibility, indicating the will of sukumbasi 
to collaborate with the state in separating the ‘authentic’ 
from the ‘inauthentic.’ 
More recently, Basobas collaborated with Social Science 
Baha to create digital maps of the settlements in the city. A 
research team comprising members of Social Science Baha 
and Basobas finished conducting the survey in 2014. Social 
Science Baha trained the researchers and provided them 
necessary research tools such as GPS machines. “When we 
Google Kathmandu, our settlements are not mapped. We 
are invisible. The long-term goal of this survey is to make 
ourselves visible through Google,” says Smita, one of the 
Basobas leaders. The mapping project, however, also has 
a tendency to re-inscribe the cleavage among sukumbasi. 
Smita further claims, “Once we have the map, it is easier 
for us to manage the settlements. In that, we can prevent 
new addition of households to the existing settlements, 
which is important for staying away from the ‘inauthentic-
ity’ blame.” 
This project of visibility reveals not only the means of 
reproduction of authenticity/inauthenticity discourse, 
but also the privileging of ‘time’ as a maker and logic 
of authenticity. The prevention of ‘new additions’ in-
dicates that there are and there will be sukumbasi who 
will not be eligible for making claims as the ‘authentic’                 
sukumbasi through the logic framed by Basobas. In Kath-
mandu, these groups are among the sukumbasi who have 
a relatively more recent history of settlement in the city, 
and as a result, do not share as strong links with the local 
and municipal states as the older ones—those without 
enough political and symbolic capital to weather the storm 
of eviction. Equally importantly, one may argue, digital 
maps and biometric procedures conducted through the 
deployment of technologies such as laptops, cameras, and 
GPS systems, are a project of visibility that has a tendency 
to aestheticize the politics of the poor in the process. This 
kind of aestheticization of politics led by the sukumbasi is 
necessary to keep open the field of possibility for collabo-
rating with the state. 
The use of the different devices to strategically inhabit 
the state’s claims of ‘inauthenticity’ enable sukumbasi to 
enact a ‘scientific’ subjectivity with the hope that such a 
move would help create governable space for sukumbasi 
to co-inhabit with the state. In other words, through the 
adoption of the biometric survey tool and Google maps, 
some section of the sukumbasi were willing to accept the 
fictitious authentic/inauthentic dichotomy in order to 
be able to work collaboratively with the government to 
find out ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi. As Chatterjee (2004: 57) 
might argue, this was the sukumbasi way of “investing 
their collective identity with a moral content of a com-
munity,” whereby, a certain politics of aesthetics begins 
to take shape in the form of digital IDs, digital maps and 
aerial photographs. The adoption of biometric survey tools 
and the self-enumeration survey results indicate that the 
urban poor are not just passive recipients of instruments 
of governmentality imposed on them from above. Rather, 
these tools are actively utilized on ‘scientific’ grounds, to 
engage the state’s demands but through the devices that 
the sukumbasi deploy.  
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Conclusion 
I have, so far, discussed two key ideas, aesthetics and 
inauthenticity, which coalesce to frame the environment 
along with the poor. To recall, certain imagery of aesthet-
ics was conjured to cater to the middle-class sensibilities. 
The content of the politics of aesthetics was not so much 
derived from ‘fantasy futurism,’ as many ‘world class’ 
aspirant cities might desire. Rather, riparian aesthetics is 
to be reclaimed via revival of ‘civilization’ and restoration 
of the river’s ‘purity.’ In the process, poor and poverty are 
reframed through similar logic of aesthetics as the riparian 
environment. The politics of aesthetics as it is deployed 
portray the poor and poverty through the frame of what 
Ghertner (2016) calls “codes of civility and appearance.” 
Meaning, if the urban poor, or sukumbasi, appear like they 
can afford to follow these codes, they are ‘inauthentic’ and 
they are assumed to own land elsewhere in the city. They 
have to ‘look’ poor. 
Ananya Roy calls this logic the “aestheticization of pover-
ty,” which alludes to the reduction of relationship between 
the viewers and viewed to one of “aesthetics rather than 
politics” (2004). “Thus reduced, evictions and resettlement 
become not tales of destruction of individual people’s lives 
and livelihoods, but simply the erasure of an image of a 
slum, emptied of the people who live within it,” argues 
Bhan (2009: 140). But politics of aesthetic and authentic, 
as deployed, become not just tales of erasure of livelihood 
and lifestyle. There is more to it. Poor people are not mere-
ly passive recipients of the politics of aesthetic deployed 
by the state or other powerful actors. Instead, they devise 
ways to inhabit the state-produced discourse of ‘inauthen-
ticity,’ and turn it on its head to find newer ways to make 
demands. This acquiescence to allegations of ‘inauthentic-
ity’ may first appear as inclusionary as it could potentially 
encourage (some) collaboration with the state; in reality, is 
exclusive. However, the strategy of gaining state legiti-
macy inevitably reproduces the discourse of ‘authentic’ 
and ‘inauthentic,’ without transcending the ideology and 
politics that produce such a discourse in the first place. In 
so doing, their acquiescence produces new class cleav-
ages among sukumbasi while re-inscribing the older ones. 
The problem with this strategy is that although this may 
help to achieve participation in the planning process for 
some sukumbasi households, it does so at the expense of a 
collaborative mode of engagement among wider sukumbasi 
communities. Adopting the state’s frames to distinguish 
between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi, the move-
ment’s leadership produces class cleavages among sukum-
basi—between those who were alleged to be ‘landed’ and 
those given a landless designation. Finally, the relational 
co-constitution of bourgeois environmentalism—that 
which aspires to produce the authentic city—with the 
politics of the poor ends up reducing the politics of the 
poor into the realms of aesthetics. This dynamic creates a 
rupture amongst the poor, not just on terms of ‘authentici-
ty/inauthenticity’, but also in terms of aesthetics. 
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Endnotes
1. Ramesh Prasad Bhusal, “PM inaugurates BAP,” The 
Himalayan Times, December 25, 2009, accessed November 
16, 2016, <http://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/
pm-nepal-inaugurates-bap/>. 
2. Pragati Shahi, “Shouldering burden to revive lost 
glory,” The Kathmandu Post, August 7, 2012, accessed 
November 16, 2016, <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.
com/news/2012-08-06/shouldering-burden-to-revive-lost-
glory.html>. 
3. This notion of ‘inauthentic sukumbasi’, or 
‘inauthenticity’, that I use frequent in this chapter, and 
that forms one of the central concepts of this chapter, is an 
English translation of the Nepali term ‘nakkali sukumabsi’, 
that state officials mostly use during interviews as well as 
informal conversations. 
4. I call this a ‘homemade version’ because Kathmandu’s 
march to modernity is not directly dictated by global 
financial capitalism in the same way the aspirants of the 
‘world class’ tag such as Delhi or Mumbai.
5.  Based on interviews conducted with some of the earlier 
sukumbasi settlers in the city, Buddha Nagar is one of the 
oldest settlements in the city, its origin dating back to the 
1970s. 
6. No one, including sukumbasi or Lumanti, who work 
with them, disagree that there are landowning sukumbasi 
either in Kathmandu or elsewhere. However, the land 
owned elsewhere is uninhabitable for several reasons. 
For example, it is in a remote area without access to 
services. Additionally, in the last five years, there has 
been a notable increase in the number and size of loans 
borrowed from cooperatives for purchasing land in the 
city. Lajana Manandhar, who works closely with the 
cooperatives, claims that sukumbasi purchasing land in 
the city own the land but cannot afford to build a house. 
The bigger question, reminds Manandhar, is how do we 
address housing and shelter as poverty moves from the 
countryside to the city—from the rural to the urban? 
(Rademacher 2009).
7. Basobas is a central organization of the sukumbasi 
population in Nepal. It has a federated network spread 
across forty-four different districts. A rights-based 
organization, Basobas advocates for landownership-based 
shelter rights of sukumbasi in Nepal.  
8. Hukumbasi is a term that is used derogatorily to denote 
landowning sukumbasi; dalal is a derogatory term for a land 
broker. 
9. SDI is a network of urban poor communities, including 
squatter communities, in over thirty-three cities in the 
global South. SDI occasionally provides funding to Basobas 
on a regular basis for covering logistics and organizational 
expenses. But more importantly, they also provide 
different template for Basobas that become the basis for 
organizing around advocacy works.   
10. Mahesh Bahadur Basnet was the chairman of BAP 
during the time of the fieldwork in 2012. His term ended in 
2013.
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